Seminars topic: When are people more strongly motivated to intervene in others’ decisions under risk? This study considers two dimensions: the difficulty of the decision problem and the informational advantage of the Choice Architect (CA). An easier decision problem—proxied by a larger gap between the expected payoffs of the two options—leads to significantly more intervention. In addition, having the opportunity to share private information lowers the intervention by the CA. The study proposes a theory of a benevolent CA who overestimates the decision errors of the decision maker, offering an explanation for the CA’s paternalistic behavior.

Scholars Background: Prof. Jie Zheng is a Professor at Shandong University. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley, and his M.A. from Tsinghua University. He serves as Co-Editor of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, holds multiple editorial positions in SCI/SSCI journals, and has led several national research projects. His work focuses on behavioral economics, experimental economics, applied microeconomics, and decision theory. Professor Zheng has received numerous awards, including the Shandong “Taishan Scholar” Distinguished Professor honor, and has delivered invited talks at major domestic and international academic conferences.

Time and Location: 10:30–11:30, November 20, 2025, Room A523, School of Management

Language: EN & CN

Host: Prof. Fadong Chen