Seminars topic: This seminar explores how buyers should manage suppliers who become more efficient over time through learning. The research introduces a new class of repeated procurement problems where a buyer commits to a long-term contract. In each period, the supplier observes their private capability and learning ability, produces goods, and learns from experience. A dynamic principal-agent model is developed to balance supplier learning, information screening, and supply chain efficiency. The study reveals that while supplier learning can boost efficiency, it can also distort supply chain dynamics. It examines strategic effects such as the buyer’s use of payment structures to influence supplier behavior. These findings offer new insights into when buyers should choose long-term suppliers and how dynamic learning influences contract decisions.

Scholars Background: Professor LONG Gao teaches at UC Riverside. He received his Ph.D. from Penn State and both B.E. and M.E. from Tsinghua University. His research focuses on dynamic information and incentives in operations management, particularly when decision-critical information is dispersed and evolves over time. His work spans business practice in services, transportation, supply chains, salesforce management, inventory control, and healthcare. He has published in top journals including Management Science (MS), Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (MSOM), and Production and Operations Management (POMS).

Time and Location: June 13, 2025, 10:00–11:00, Room A823, School of Management

Language: EN & CN