Workshop’s Topic: In this talk, I will discuss a series of game models for capacity reservation in a supply chain setting. The general problem we consider involves a buyer first reserving capacity from multiple suppliers and then using the reserved capacity to generate revenue. The suppliers compete by offering a two-dimensional price (i.e., reservation price and execution price), and our focus is on understanding the suppliers’ bidding behaviors in this setting. The first model considers a discrete version of the problem in which the suppliers each owning a block of capacity determine two scalar prices, and the buyer is restricted to reserve the whole block or nothing. The second model considers a continuous version of the problem in which the suppliers bid in the form of supply functions and the buyer can reserve any amount of capacity. We characterize Nash equilibria for the models and study the properties of the equilibria.

Time and Location: 10:00 AM (GMT+8), Room A523 (School of Management)

Language: Bilingual (Chinese and English)